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Abstract  
This paper attempts to describe part of the history of Chinese rural migration to urban 
industrial areas. Using a case study of a township in Sichuan, the author examines a 
type of rural development which she defines as a “bottom-up” style strategy of 
regional development. Different types of social mobility are observed in the case 
study, and over its long history, migration in the township has offered diverse means 
of social mobility to the local peasants. The paper concludes by considering the 
diversity and limits of Chinese social mobility at this stage. 
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1. Introduction 
Sichuan Province in southwestern China is located in a region far distant from 
the movement toward marketization due to the fact that China’s economic development 
started with economic reforms in 1978 which emerged in the coastal area of 
southeastern China. The inland area of southwestern China has remained 
underdeveloped, with many mountainous and hilly areas, a relatively small proportion 
of cultivated land, and a large population. It has mainly been an agricultural area, but 
because of the small size of households’ agricultural holdings, peasants’ agricultural 
income has been low for a number of decades.   
 Given these conditions, people are driven to consider emigration as a means of 
increasing their income. However, the size of emigration differs dramatically among the 
several provinces of southwestern China. Sichuan Province, with 82 million in 
population, has 13 million emigrants, 1  representing 15% its population (2000 
population census). Most of the emigrants are migrant workers (nongmingong or 
mingong in Chinese) going away for work for their families’ sake. On the other hand, 
Yunnan Province, which has 42 million in population, which is basically half of 
Sichuan’s, has only 3 million people (less than one-fourth of Sichuan’s) emigrating. 
Among China’s southwestern provinces, Sichuan is outstanding not only for the size of 
its emigration, but also for the migrants’ incomes and their contributions to household 
income. 
                                                  
1 “Emigrants” as used herein refers to locally registered residents who are away from 
their townships and villages for more than three months. 
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 The purpose of this paper is to explore why Sichuan, in particular among other 
southwestern Chinese provinces with similar geographical and economic conditions, 
managed to send out so many migrant workers and to consider what kinds of 
consequences the individual migrants have realized.   
In the early stage of Chinese economic reform, peasants’ migration to urban 
areas was not authorized by the central government. So, the early stream of migration 
was a kind of informal action without institutional supports. The hypothesis of this 
paper is that, in Sichuan, the local government took the initiative in supporting peasants’ 
emigration and realized a bottom-up institutionalization. As its result, whereas 
institutionalization by the central government was delayed in the area of labor migration, 
Sichuan has been successful in sending out a large amount of rural laborers and 
increasing the size of emigration.    
 
2. Bottom-up Style of Regional Development 
Generally speaking, regional development refers to a development strategy 
planned by the central government. Here, we define it as the top-down style of regional 
development. In the case of top-down style regional development, the central 
government adopts a policy, and then local governments carry it out. In contrast, 
Sichuan’s migration support policy which is under discussion here was an action 
initiated by the lowest level of local government. This means that the lowest level of 
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township and village governments took the first action, then the upper level of county 
government adopted these actions as policy, and finally the provincial government 
adopted the actions as provincial development policy. Since this represents a series of 
institutionalizations starting at the lowest level and trickling up to upper level 
governments, let us define it as a bottom-up style of regional development. Local 
government consists of four levels in China: province, district, county and township, 
and village. For the purposes of this paper, unless otherwise specified, “local 
government” refers to all four of these levels of government. 
Kato (1997:107) mentions that, in developing countries, economic 
development is hindered by the lack of a market or a defective market. In such cases, 
governments often take on the task of forming or enhancing their markets. He also says 
that, in developing countries other than China, the government might be the central 
government, but in case of China during its economic reform era, local governments 
prominently played this role.  
The local governments’ role as a market promoter may be described as 
consisting of two aspects (Kato 1997:106-133). One aspect is the local? government’s 
economic function wherein it acts like a for-profit enterprise. Oi (1992, 1995) notes that 
local governments in China, in order to increase their fiscal revenue, afford many kinds 
of economic benefits to the companies in their administrative districts. For instance, 
local governments using their administrative power may gather information, capital, and 
materials which the companies cannot access in the market and offer these to the 
companies. Or, they may also assist companies with administrative services such as 
issuing permits and licenses, and reducing taxes. Kato (1997) calls this type of local 
government action the “behavioral principle of enterprise.” 
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Kato observes another aspect of Chinese local governments which is called the 
“behavioral principle of community.” This relates to local governments’ economically 
irrational behavior, such as giving priority to the local expansion of employment or 
income redistribution even with some sacrifice in economic efficiency. He argues that 
Chinese local governments are distinctive in that they display both of these aspects.    
 Ishihara (2000:59-60) also pays attention to Chinese local governments’ 
positive contribution to their local economic development. Their roles are described in 
the five following points: 1) taking economic leadership in promotion of profitable 
industries and local brands or opening up of new markets, 2) offering public goods and 
services, 3) adopting radical reforms which central governments have never attempted, 
4) promoting opening-up policies such as attracting foreign capital, and 5) offering daily 
and social security to residents. Here, we might pay attention to the third point by noting 
that local governments often adopt radical reforms which are not authorized by the 
central government. 
 Another related study about the role of local governments is from the field of 
political economy. Miyake (2006:2) argues that the most important incentive provided 
by Chinese local government for economic growth is its merit assessment system, 
which results in “local government-driven” economic development. The functions of 
local governments in China comprise a broad range of economic interests and their own 
interests, but the authority over personnel placement of local government leaders is in 
complete control of the upper level government. For this reason, local government 
leaders always work with an awareness of how they will be evaluated under the merit 
assessment. 
 Especially during the economic reform era after 1978, the central government 
pursued economic development as its main aim. In this environment, the economic 
development level of local governments became one of the most important standards 
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used by the central government for the merit evaluation of local governments and also 
for the selection of local leaders (Zheng 1995:28).    
 In the following chapter, local governments’ active role in supporting migration 
will be discussed. 
 
3. Income and Employment of Rural Households of Southwestern China 
Table 1 shows the change in rural household income during the 25 years after the 
economic reform. We can see that 1) the average rural household income in west China 
is consistently lower than the average of China overall, 2) among the southwestern 
provinces, Sichuan’s household income is the highest (actually, it rose higher than the 
average of western China’s 12 provinces), and 3) on the other hand, the household 
incomes of Yunnan and Guizhou are much lower than those of Sichuan, Chongqing, and 
Guangxi. 
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Table 2 shows that, among the components of rural household income, 
household management income, which includes agricultural income and wage income, 
contributes quite a large share.   
Table 1 Average Income of Rural Housholds per Capita
(Unit: RMB)
Year Income per capita
China
 West China 12 provinces
Guanxi ChongqingSichuan Guizhou Yunnan
1980 191.3 172.7 137.7 ? 187.9 161.5 150.1
1985 397.6 316.2 303.0 ? 315.1 287.8 338.3
1990 686.3 552.7 639.5 ? 557.8 435.1 540.9
1995 1577.7 1116.8 1446.1 ? 1158.3 1086.6 1011.0
2000 2253.4 1661.0 1864.5 1892.4 1903.6 1374.2 1478.6
2005 4631.2 3646.0 3717.5 3783.0 4158.2 2660.6 3179.2
Note: West China 12 provinces includes; Inner mongoria, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan,
Guizhou,Yunnan, Tibet, Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang.
Source: China Year Book of Rural Houshold Survey (2005: 97,121,155,189,223,282, 2010:108,275).
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 Table 3 shows the components of wage income. From this, we can see that, 
firstly, compared to the national average, the average wage income is lower in each of 
China’s southwestern provinces; however, secondly, the outstanding difference is seen in 
the contribution of “outside employment income” which refers to income earned by 
migrant workers outside the townships and villages. Guangxi, Chongqing and Sichuan’s 
share of migrant income is higher, which reflects that it is not easy for the peasants in 
southeastern China to earn good wage income locally. Thirdly, in contrast, migrant 
income in Guizhou and Yunnan is quite low. In particular, Yunnan’s wage income as a 
whole is extremely low, and at the same time, its income from outside employment is 
also low.        
Table 2 Structure of Peasants' Average Income per Capita (2009) 
Wages Agricultur
al income
Property
income
Transfer
income
China 5153.2 40.0 49.0 3.2 7.7
West 12 3816.5 ? ? ? ?
Guangxi 3980.4 36.8 56.0 1.0 6.2
Chongqing 4478.4 42.9 47.2 1.5 8.5
Sichuan 4462.1 40.8 46.5 2.1 10.6
Guizhou 3005.4 35.7 51.2 2.7 10.4
Yunnan 3369.3 20.3 67.6 3.8 8.2
Note: West China 12 provinces includes; Inner mongoria, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan,
Guizhou,Yunnan, Tibet, Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang.
Source: China Year Book of Rural Houshold Survey (2010:116,344).
Househol
d income
(RMB)
Component ratio(%)
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 The above allows us to comprehend the characteristics of southwestern China. 
It is apparent that 1) in southwestern China, as in China overall, wage income is the key 
component of rural household income, 2) wages from migrant work are the main cause 
of the difference in rural household income amounts, and 3) the opportunities for 
migration vary greatly between regions. 
 Table 4 shows the number of emigrants from each province, based on the year 
2000 population census data. Sichuan is the largest sender of migrants both inside and 
outside Sichuan. From this table, we can see that, in Sichuan, the amount of migration is 
massive. We shall examine how migration became so popular in Sichuan and what 
kinds of benefits individual people derive from the widely spread migration 
opportunities.      
 
Table 3 Components of Peasants' Wage Income (2009)
Employment
income inside
township and
village
Employment
income
outside
Employment
income
excluding
enterprises
China 2061.3 48.5 52.4 10.3
Guangxi 1465.2 36.6 52.4 11
Chongqing 1919.7 30.2 63.7 6.1
Sichuan 1821.4 29.2 62.9 7.9
Guizhou 1074.3 44.5 39.6 16
Yunnan 685 66.1 20.4 13.5
Source: China Year Book of Rural Houshold Survey (2010:346-347).
Amount of
wage
income
(RMB)
Component ratio(%)
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Tabel 4 Size of Population and Migration of Each Province (2000) 
?Unit: million people?
Resistered population of "hukou"
Total Inside
province
Outside
province
1 Sichuan 82.3 13.1 6.129 6.9
2 Guangtong 85.2 10.7 10.24 0.4
3 Hunan 63.3 8.4 4.047 4.3
4 Jiangsu 73.0 8.3 6.563 1.7
5 Hubei 59.5 7.9 5.095 2.8
6 Henan 91.2 7.8 4.724 3.1
7 Anhui 59.0 7.7 3.328 4.3
8 Shantong 90.0 7.5 6.435 1.1
9 Jiangxi 40.4 6.8 3.112 3.7
10 Zhejiang 45.9 6.4 4.91 1.5
11 Liaoning 41.8 5.8 5.437 0.4
12 Guangxi 43.9 5.2 2.806 2.4
13 Hebei 66.7 5.2 3.951 1.2
14 Fujian 34.1 4.6 3.766 0.8
15 Heilongjian 36.2 4.6 3.382 1.2
16 Neimenggu 23.3 3.8 3.28 0.5
17 Guizhou 35.2 3.6 2.007 1.6
18 Shanxi 32.5 3.4 3.053 0.3
19 Jilin 26.8 3.2 2.641 0.6
20 Chongqing 30.5 3.2 2.222 1.0
21 Yunnan 42.4 3.1 2.707 0.3
22 Shanxi 35.4 2.7 1.939 0.8
23 Shanghai 16.4 2.4 2.25 0.1
24 Beijing 13.6 2.3 2.174 0.1
25 Gangsu 25.1 1.9 1.329 0.6
26 Xinjiang 18.5 1.6 1.419 0.2
27 Tianjin 9.8 1.5 1.447 0.1
28 Hainan 7.6 0.7 0.596 0.1
29 Ningxia 5.5 0.6 0.481 0.1
30 Qinghai 4.8 0.5 0.398 0.1
31 Xizang 2.6 0.1 0.105 0.0
Total 1,242.6 144.4 101.972 42.4
Source: 2000 population census of China (2002 volume 1:
2,730,750-757)
Provinces
Migrants
Note: The definition of "migrant" is someone who stays more than
6 months outside his or her township or village.
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4. Development of the “Migration Economy” 
Sichuan has a registered population of 89.8 million (huji renkou), and its 
agricultural population amounts to 67 million (Sichuan Statistical Yearbook 2010:68). 
Sichuan’s average cultivated acreage is 0.8 mu (1 mu is 670 square meters) which is 
considerably smaller than the national average of 2 mu. This population pressure on the 
land is presumed to be the main reason for Sichuan’s strong orientation toward 
immigration. 
The provincial government of Sichuan has been publicizing the idea that 
“development of migration is one of Sichuan’s most important strategies” (Sichuan 
Yearbook 2006:617). As a regional development strategy, this is very unique because its 
target is an increase in peasants’ migration rather than development of some 
conventional industry. The provincial government of Sichuan refers to it as “labor force 
development (lao wu kai fa)” and supports peasants’ migration in order to increase rural 
household income and also as a leading industry for the development of the rural 
economy.  
What led to the formulation of this idea for regional development in the minds 
of Sichuan’s leaders? In Sichuan, migration initially began with voluntary movement by 
peasants seeking job opportunities. This is common in rural areas nowadays, but in 
Sichuan, migration started at the end of the 1970’s, which was slightly earlier than in 
other places. At that time, in Sichuan, the contracted management system had just been 
adopted, and peasants were freed from production team work. They then began to 
venture into the rural free markets to earn money for their living. Their main 
destinations for work were the relatively developed medium to large cities inside 
Sichuan and also in the neighbor provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou. The migrant were 
self-employed in repair work, transportation, sewing, and food and drink services, and 
they were employed in construction and mining. 
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In the mid-1980’s, people started to notice that their neighbors were migrating 
for work and returning with their earnings. At the same time, grassroots officials also 
noticed the migrant workers’ contribution to escaping from the poverty. The migrants 
not only contribute to the construction of the outside economy and fulfill the labor 
demand of the urban service sector but also have great potential for contributing to their 
home village economies (Guo 1997:241-242). The main types of migrant work during 
this period were construction and mining work or service jobs, and employers began 
using migrant laborers for these jobs quite early. Next, we will examine how the local 
governments have supported the movement of migrants.      
4-1 The work of township and village governments: The case of Z Township 
    Zhugao Township (Z Township) of Jintang County in Chengdu City is a hilly 
area, 64 kilometers away from the center of Chengdu City. Z Township has  a 
population of 50,000, and of these, 14,000 reside outside Z Township. Z Township is 
one of the earliest cases where migration support was provided by a township or village 
government. In its early stage of emigration, the Z Township government, cooperating 
with its upper level county government, played a large role. 
 The start of government support for emigration was in 1985 (Xu 2003: 
237-251). At that time, the peasants of Z Township had already progressed beyond the 
period when shortages in food and clothing were common, but peasants had little cash 
income and scraped by on a subsistence living. Secretary S of Z Township’s CPC was 
the key person who set up the township’s emigration support measures. In those days, 
Secretary S, a top leader in the township’s government, achieved good results and 
thought that the best achievement was the increase of peasants’ income and promotion 
of economic development in Z Township. However, Z Township had few industrial 
resources or human resources with special skills, and each peasant’s 0.8 mu of land was 
too small to earn a good income. Secretary S thought the only way to achieve an 
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increase in peasants’ income and government’s fiscal revenue was to rely on the outside 
world. At the beginning of the 1980’s, the opportunity to migrate for work was limited 
to a few peasants who had relatives or friends in other cities. Secretary S considered 
how to spread migration opportunities to other peasants. 
 At that time, a job offer from a spinning mill in Chengdu arrived from the labor 
office of the upper county level government. Z Township reacted positively to this offer, 
and the township government, working through its women’s federation, organized 60 
women to go to the factory. For the applicants and their families, Chengdu was a good 
location for work because of its proximity to Z Township and the ease of estimating 
transportation cost and the price of goods. The women’s families welcomed the labor 
contract which was concluded between the county labor office and the factory. The 
peasants trusted the “government” at that time. 
 With the success of this first migrant dispatch project, Z Township’s initiative 
became known to its people. So in March 1986, Z Township’s government established a 
labor dispatch office. It sent 2,214 laborers to 21 factories and companies in Chengdu 
during the four years from 1986 to 1989. 
 Then in 1987, Chengdu City started to expel immigrant workers. With this as a 
turning point, Z Township abandoned Chengdu as a favorable destination with low risk 
and started to seek a new destination for its laborers.  
In December 1987, the labor office of Jintang County received information that 
Guangdong had a large need for laborers. To conduct an inspection, five representatives 
from the county labor office, the labor service company (laodong fuwu gongsi) under 
the labor office, and Z Township’s labor dispatch office went to Guangdong. They 
toured Zhuhai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen and finally choose Dongguang as it was a 
late-developing area in Guangdong with huge potential for economic development, 
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while the price of goods was still reasonable and public security was tolerable. They 
concluded a cooperation agreement for labor service with Dongguang City, and then the 
labor service company of Dongguang introduced Houjie Township to them. 
Subsequently, the Z Township government sent their inspection team to Houjie twice, 
finally resulting in the conclusion of a contract with a leather factory in Houjie to send 
50 women workers. In 1988, government officials in Z Township recruited 50 women 
workers to meet the factory’s requirements and dispatched them to the factory. The Z 
Township government sent a government official to Houjie and opened a Houjie office 
to mediate between the Z government and the factory. The office gathered job 
information, made labor contracts with factories, sent laborers, and mediated conflicts 
as needed. Since there was no free labor market, the government, instead of the market, 
mediated between the employers and the laborers. 
Secretary S of Z township received a high evaluation for the success of this 
labor dispatch project and was later selected for the post of Jintang County governor. 
Furthermore, he produced good results in Jintang County in the field of labor dispatch 
and was promoted to become the secretary of the county’s communist party. 
In the case of Z Township, the township government played a direct role in 
gathering job information and in organizing and sending the laborers. In the early stage 
of migration, migrants lack these critical resources, and in the case of Z Township, the 
government happened to play this central role.  
4-2. Evaluation of the local governments’ role in “bottom-up style regional 
development” 
We have examined the grassroots local government’s positive role in 
supporting labor migration to the outside. This is considered to be “bottom-up style 
regional development” which the author delineated in Section 2. The provincial 
16 
 
government of Sichuan later established the “labor service development group” and its 
secretariat office in the government and set up a management system for labor 
migration targets set at each government level, exploring the broad labor dispatch 
market between each level of Sichuan’s local government and governments outside the 
region. The Sichuan government absorbed the experiences of the initiatives at its lower 
levels and adopted their policies. 2  Since these “bottom-up style” policies were 
institutionalized after trial at the grassroots level, they tend to practical and effective.     
 Meanwhile, the institutionalization of migration by the central government was 
longer delayed. The state council issued a principle for resolving the problems of 
Nongmingong in 2006. This is considered to be the first comprehensive policy for 
settling migrants in the destination areas and mentions 1) the low wages of migrants and 
the lack of or delay in wage payment, 2) well-ordered labor management , 3) offering of 
job information and skill training, 4) offering of social security and common services, 5) 
protection of human rights and benefits of migrants, 6) realization of non-agricultural 
employment nearby, and 7) establishment of leading organizations for migration 
services. These are important principles which represent the central government’s stance, 
but since there is no funding from the central government, the enforcement will differ 
depending on each local government’s efforts. 
With consideration for these principles of the central government, the Sichuan 
provincial government issued a policy in July 2006. This policy includes 1) setting 
specific target numbers for migration, 2) offering occupational skill training for rural 
laborers, 3) emigration of rural laborers and promotion of non-agricultural employment, 
3) increasing wages and solving the problem of delayed and unpaid wages, 4) 
organizing labor management order, 5) resolving social security problems, 6) offering 
public services, 7) creating institutions for the protection of human rights and the 
benefits of migrants, and 8) establishing leading organizations for migration services. 
                                                  
2 See the other paper for a more detailed discussion of the process of “bottom-up style 
regional development.” 
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 This policy of Sichuan is basically composed of the same measures that have 
been implemented since the mid-1980’s. This “bottom-up style regional development” 
was institutionalized in the central government’s policy. 
 In Section 2, we discussed the “behavioral principle of enterprise” and the 
“behavioral principle of community” which are two aspects of local government. In the 
local governments’ actions in the institutionalization of migration support, we can 
observe both these aspects of local government. For example, the township and village 
governments’ actions to assist their peasants’ emigration in order to increase their 
income is considered to be an instance of the “behavioral principle of community.” On 
the other hand, in the process, the township government collaborated with its upper 
level (county) government, using the advantage of administrative resources for success 
in supporting its peasants’ emigration. This is considered to be an instance of the 
“behavioral principle of enterprise,” wherein the local township and county 
governments work for a common benefit. 
 What is their common benefit? Of course, we might think of the economic 
effect of returned migrants, but in the early stage of migration, few emigrants managed 
to learn skills, earn adequate money and start their own businesses. Local governments 
at that time never anticipated an economic effect from the returned migrants, yet in Z 
Township, an economic effect became apparent from the late 2000’s. However, the new 
wave of migration seems to be a result of marketization, not the government’s actions as 
before. Let us review the recent changes in migration in the case of Z Township in the 
following section. 
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5. Emergence of Entrepreneurs and Returned Migrants in Z Township 
According to the author’s recent fieldwork, the government’s migrant dispatch 
project in Z Township was the main channel of Z Township’s migration until the early 
1990’s, a period in which there was an excess of labor in the market. However, after the 
increase in demand for labor in the late 1990’s, especially after the migrant labor 
shortage (min gong huang) during and following 2004, Z Township’s official migrant 
dispatch project totally disappeared. At that time, seeking jobs became much easier for 
the migrants, and the migrants had developed many of their own information channels. 
No one needed government’s help in seeking jobs. 
A new occurrence after the labor shortage in 2004 was the emergence of small 
factories in Z Township and an increase in the return of migratory peasants. This started 
in 2006, when there were eight factories in the township. The number of factories 
increased to 14 during 2007 to 2009 and to 16 factories since 2010. Among the 16 
factories in 2011, 11 were shoe factories and 5 were the clothing factories.  
Table 5 shows the types of factories, the year established, and information 
about the entrepreneurs. Regarding the profiles of entrepreneurs, 1) most of them were 
among the early emigrants to Guangdong in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, 2) most of the 
entrepreneurs established the same type of industry as they worked in Guangdong, and 
3) some factories (factories 3, 5, and 6 in Table 5) have outside owners but are managed 
by Z Township residents.  
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Most of the factories are new and have fewer than 100 employees. They also 
experience a significant seasonal fluctuation in the number of employees. 
 
  
Table 6 shows the working conditions in the factories. We observe the following: 1) 
long working hours and few days off; three factories offer no holidays during a month 
(Although one requires no overtime, and another requires no overtime on Saturday 
night), 2) wages are paid for piece work (some factories have minimum wage but the 
others do not), and 3) although the factories are located in the township and most 
Table 5. Factories in Z Township, 2011
Name of
factory
Type of
industry
Year
established
Entrepreneur Numbers of
employees
1 Pengcheng stock raising 2004 34 year-old woman, Z Township resident 48
2 Yongrui clothing 2007 39 years old woman, Z Township resident 100
3 Shifang shoes 2007 Outside people from Chongqing, men in 40s 20
4 Fumin clothing 2008 41 years old women, Z Township resident 60
5 Chuanfu shoes 2008 Outside people from Zizhong County, men in 30s 100
6 Lianmeng shoes 2010 Outside people from Jianyang County, 36 year-old men 67
7 Jinhua shoes 2010 42 years old men, Z Township resident 21
8 Tianya shoes 2011 40 years old men, Z Township resident 75
9 Tongxin shoes 2011 32 years old women, Z Township resident 26
Source: Interviews at the factories.
Table 6. Working Conditions at Factories in Z Township, 2011
Type of
industry Work hours
Holidays
Wages Dormitory
1 stock raising 8:00-12:00?14:00-18:00 No Minimum RMB 800+piece rates, Ave. 1000 Free of charge
2 clothing 8:00-21:30 Suterday Piece rates,  RMB1200-2000 Free of charge
3 shoes 8:00-9:30 1-2 days in month Piece rates, RMB1600-1700 Free of charge
4 clothing 8:00-supper-22:00 No Piece rates, RMB1400-2000 Free of charge
5 shoes 8:00-12:00?13:30-17:30?19:00-21:00 2 days in month Piece rates for product workers 15 RMB/month
6 shoes 8:00-12:00,12:30-18:00 2 days in month Piece rates, Ave. RMB1700 Free of charge
7 shoes 8:00-12:00,13:30-18:00,-supper-20:30 1-2 days in month Minimum wage +piece rates Free of charge
8 shoes 8:30-lunchi30min.-17:30 1-2 days in month Minimum wage +piece rates, RMB1500-1600 No
9 shoes 8:00-12:00?1:30-5:00 No Minimum wage +pieace rates Free of charge
Source: Interviews at the factories.
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workers are residents of the township, most factories have dormitories for the workers. 
Because of the long work hours and the poor transportation, many workers need to stay 
in the dormitory and go home only on the holiday, once a week or one to two times a 
month. 
 So, who are the migrant workers who returned to Z Township? Most of them 
are migrants who returned from Guangdong, particularly from the shoe factories in 
Houjie which were the main destination of Z Township’s migrants. Since they were 
working in skilled positions in shoe or clothing factories, they have searched the same 
type of position in Z Township. So far, more than 90% of the returned migrants are 
women in their 30’s and 40’s. They are raising children or have elderly parents for 
whom they have to care, so they are forced to return even if they have no chance for a 
job there. It is not the case that the working conditions and the wage levels attract them 
to return. Their husbands are still working in Guangdong or Chengdu to earn enough 
money for their family.  
 So what causes the migrants to come home? As mentioned, the low wages and 
poor working conditions in Z Township’s factories are not the reason they decide to 
come home. They have other non-economic reasons (mainly their children or parents) 
that cause them to decide to come home. The entrepreneurs in Z Township take 
advantage of their additional time gained from being close to their home and enjoy the 
cheap labor provided by them. 
 The u-turned laborers were migrants who had to travel far from their 
hometown to find job opportunities. Now they have the chance to work inside the 
township. This could be interpreted as a positive change for Z Township, but at the same 
time, this is negative evidence for Chinese social mobility. The workers need to come 
back to care for their children and parents, which indicates that they have difficulty 
moving their families close to their workplaces. Even skilled laborers or management 
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staff who had achieved a good job might be forced by this reality to return home.       
6. Conclusion 
Sichuan Province in southwestern China was a late-developing area, and it 
adopted a policy of regional development that relied on peasant emigration to the 
developed area of Guangdong. In the very beginning, emigration was an individual 
action, limited to a few local peasants who had their own connections to the outside 
world. In the case of Z Township which is the subject of this paper, the township 
government played a positive role in gathering job information, organizing peasants, 
and dispatching them to the work destination. These actions by the government are 
considered to be a complementary use of administrative resources in the marke. So 
after the late 1990’s when migrants themselves possessed adequate information, the 
government’s support work disappeared gradually. In this paper, the process is 
explained as “bottom-up style development,” which is common in China’s local 
development. 
A new occurrence in Z Township since 2005 is the emergence of small 
factories. This was spurred by changes in the macro economy and society, including the 
high cost of labor and materials in the coastal area and the difficulty of moving entire 
families to the work location, etc. Some local entrepreneurs who had previously been 
migrants in Guangdong took advantage of this and opened factories, which enabled 
local peasants to work in their own township. However, so far, most of the workers are 
women who had other reasons (such as taking care of family) to return. So, the factories 
in Z Township seem to be enjoying the advantage of cheap labor.  
In terms of the social mobility of peasants, the initiation of the migration 
support policy was a positive change. The emergence of entrepreneurs in Z Township 
and the job opportunities these factories offer are positive aspects of marketization. 
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However, here we can also observe the negative aspects of “bottom-up” style 
development. Because this was essentially a market-driven development, the scope of 
policy is limited to the region, and so it cannot resolve the problems at the state level. 
The reason why the migrants to Guangdong were forced to return home and work for 
lower wages under worse conditions is the lack of a social system to guarantee 
immigrants the ability to live in cities. This is the issue which the central government 
should consider and for which it should take action.  
 
  
?
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